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Background: People with schizophrenia experience significant deficits in empathic skills, 
which are important for effective interpersonal relationships. Researchers have speculated 
about the roles of personal distress, emotion regulation, and metacognition in empathic 
interaction, but the impact of these constructs on empathy has yet to be empirically 
investigated. This study examines the relationships among these constructs in a sample of 
people with schizophrenia receiving community-based treatment (N = 58). It was 
hypothesized that better emotion regulation and metacognition, as well as reduced 
personal distress, would predict empathy. Further, emotion regulation was expected to 
mediate the relationship between personal distress and empathy, and metacognition was 
expected to moderate the relationship between personal distress and empathy. Method: 
Participants with schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder completed self-report 
questionnaires of emotion regulation and personal distress, a performance-based measure 
of empathy, and an observer-rated interview to assess metacognition. Results: 
Metacognition, but not emotion regulation or personal distress, significantly predicted 
cognitive empathy performance, with a trend-level association for affective empathy 
performance. Mediation analyses revealed that emotion regulation mediates the 
relationship between personal distress and affective empathy performance, and 
moderation analyses revealed that metacognition moderates the same relationship. 
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Moderation results suggest the relationship between personal distress and affective 
empathy performance is significant for those with low metacognition, but that the 
relationship is the opposite of hypotheses – increased personal distress is associated with 
better performance. Conclusions: This study is the first of its kind to examine 
performance-based empathy with personal distress, emotion regulation, and 
metacognition. Results suggest interventions targeted to improve metacognition may be 
useful in enhancing empathic skills. Future work is needed to improve existing measures 
of empathy and personal distress, and to parse apart the intricacies of the relationships 
among personal distress, emotion regulation, and empathy.
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INTRODUCTION 
Empathy is an area of increasing focus in schizophrenia research, with significant 
deficits indicated in cognitive empathy (Savla, Vella, Armstrong, Penn, & Twamley, 
2013), affective empathy (Bonfils, Lysaker, Minor, & Salyers, 2016), and emotion 
perception (Kohler, Walker, Martin, Healey, & Moberg, 2010; Savla et al., 2013). 
Deficits in these areas can be problematic, as empathy is key to interpersonal 
relationships. As such, it is important to identify factors related to empathic performance 
in order to design or tailor existing interventions to assist people with schizophrenia in 
developing empathic skills. From the literature, three constructs have emerged as 
potentially important in determining empathic performance: personal distress, emotion 
regulation, and metacognition. The aim of this project was to determine the roles of these 
three constructs in empathic performance for people with schizophrenia. 
Empathy 
 Empathy is key to how we interact and form connections with others. The concept 
of empathy, or, broadly speaking, our ability to understand and share the feelings of 
others (Decety & Jackson, 2004), has long been of interest in schizophrenia. The concept 
dates back to Bleuler (1911) and Kraepelin (1919), who discussed the inability of people 
with schizophrenia to connect with others. Salovey and Mayer (1989) posited that people 
who demonstrate empathy, an integral aspect of emotional intelligence, would appear 
warm and genuine to others, facilitating creation of a large and supportive social network 
over time. This has been borne out in the literature, with recent research implicating 
empathy as a strong predictor of real-world social functioning (Bechi et al., 2017). 
Studies also suggest those high in empathy are more sensitive to emotional and socially 
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relevant information (Hofelich & Preston, 2012; Van den Brink et al., 2012), and those 
high in affective empathy in particular are more able to forgive others, an important 
relationship-maintaining behavior (McCullough et al., 1998; McCullough, Worthington 
Jr, & Rachal, 1997). Further, empathy is thought to play a key role in prosocial or 
altruistic behavior (Hoffman, 1981, 2000). One meta-analysis of studies in the general 
population found consistent, significant relationships between empathy and altruistic 
behavior across various measurement types (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987), and recent 
research has continued to find links between the two constructs (e.g., see O'Connell, 
Christakou, Haffey, & Chakrabarti, 2013). In addition to the clear importance of empathy 
for successful interactions and relationships, recent research shows that people can 
actually determine if others are high or low in empathy within just a few seconds of 
exposure to the person (Wu, Sheppard, & Mitchell, 2016), emphasizing the importance of 
empathy in the earliest stages of a relationship - meeting the other person.  
 Though it is clear that empathy plays a key role in our interpersonal interactions, 
the definition of empathy has been widely contested. Originally translated by Titchener 
(1909), the term empathy came from the German term “Einfühlung,” which can be 
literally translated as “feeling into” (pg. 18; Wispé, 1990). Though the literal translation 
seems simple, theorists have since dug deeper into the construct of empathy, producing 
numerous multifaceted definitions of the term. It is widely agreed that empathy consists 
of multiple processes (Decety & Jackson, 2004), but there has been debate as to what 
these processes are and how we should describe them. Some empathy scholars discuss 
very broad models, in which empathy encompasses all aspects of behavior designed to 
create meaningful interpersonal links (Gallese, 2003). Others describe empathy as a 
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subcomponent of a larger perception-action process, but the empathy component 
nevertheless still subsumes several additional processes, not all of which are geared to 
shared experiences with others (Preston & De Waal, 2002). Others present simpler 
models entailing three main components of empathy (De Vignemont & Singer, 2006; 
Decety & Jackson, 2004; Derntl & Regenbogen, 2014; Lee, Horan, & Green, 2015). Two 
of these components have reached a sort of consensus within the field: cognitive empathy 
and affective empathy. Cognitive empathy refers to the ability to take the perspective of 
the other person (allowing you to understand their thoughts and feelings), while affective 
empathy refers to an emotional reaction felt in response to the emotional experiences of 
another (which will frequently match the emotional state of the other; Decety & Jackson, 
2004).  
 Although a general consensus has been reached regarding existence and 
importance of cognitive and affective components of empathy, terminology to refer to 
these components is still inconsistent within the field – particularly for cognitive 
empathy. A large body of literature has now examined the construct “theory of mind,” 
which is often used synonymously with the term cognitive empathy (Green, Horan, & 
Lee, 2015; Rogers, Dziobek, Hassenstab, Wolf, & Convit, 2007). Theory of mind has 
been defined as the ability to know and understand the mental states of others (Baron-
Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001) – aligning with definitions of cognitive 
empathy. However, measurement of theory of mind has largely focused on knowing the 
thoughts and intentions of others, with less focus on emotion (although the “Reading the 
Mind in the Eyes Test” (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) is a notable exception). Though 
knowing the thoughts and intentions of others is undoubtedly important to empathy, 
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knowing their emotions is of equal (or perhaps greater) importance to empathic 
experience; further, emotional recognition and understanding is considered by some to be 
more automatic than the effortful psychological inference required to understand thoughts 
and intentions (Decety & Jackson, 2004). Thus, while the literature on theory of mind 
does inform aspects of cognitive empathy, this literature, in and of itself, may not provide 
a holistic picture of cognitive empathy.  
In addition to theory of mind, other terms have also been used to refer to cognitive 
empathy (or aspects of it), such as mind-reading, social intelligence, and mentalizing 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; Green et al., 2015). Given the parallel language of cognitive 
and affective empathy as subcomponents of a larger empathy construct, I use the term 
cognitive empathy to refer to the ability to take the perspective of the other person and 
infer thoughts and feelings, and the term affective empathy to refer to one’s other-
oriented emotional reaction felt in response to the emotional experiences of another. 
While cognitive and affective empathy have been widely researched, a third 
component of empathy has yet to reach consensus in the research community. Some have 
posited that this third component of empathy is the ability to recognize emotions in the 
facial expressions, speech, or body language of others (Derntl & Regenbogen, 2014). 
Although emotion recognition is undoubtedly key to accurate knowledge about the 
other’s thoughts and feelings, this may be a more basic process, necessary but not 
sufficient for empathic experience. Others have discussed the third component of 
empathy as a self-regulatory mechanism through which the person feeling empathy is 
able to define the boundaries of self and other, acknowledging that emotional reactions 
are in response to the experiences of others (De Vignemont & Singer, 2006; Decety & 
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Jackson, 2004; Wispé, 1986). This definition may go the furthest toward explaining the 
difference between empathy and non-empathic, self-oriented experiences of negative 
emotions when faced with others’ distress (i.e., personal distress); however, the self-
regulatory aspect of empathy remains purely theoretical, as measurement paradigms have 
not yet been developed to assess this potential aspect of empathy. In this vein, yet another 
group of researchers have defined a different component of empathy based on 
measurement, calling it “trait empathy,” referring broadly to people’s perceptions of their 
empathic tendencies; in other words, these researchers contend that self-reported 
measures of empathy assess perceived trait empathy, not actual cognitive or affective 
empathy (Lee et al., 2015).  
Despite argument as to the best definition of the empathy construct, research has 
continued to accumulate. This includes schizophrenia studies, where empathy research 
most often encompasses cognitive and affective aspects. Though emotion recognition is 
routinely studied in schizophrenia, it is usually considered an independent component of 
social cognition, with a lesser focus on empathy (e.g., see Comparelli et al., 2013). Meta-
analyses have summarized these findings, indicating deficits in cognitive aspects of 
empathy (Bora, Yucel, & Pantelis, 2009; Savla et al., 2013; Sprong, Schothorst, Vos, 
Hox, & Van Engeland, 2007), affective empathy (Bonfils et al., 2016), and emotion 
recognition (Kohler et al., 2010; Savla et al., 2013).  
Though there are commonly measured empathic components in schizophrenia 
research, there are still problems with measurement techniques in the field. Performance-
based assessments of theory of mind frequently measure some aspects of cognitive 
empathy, but most do not assess emotional perspective-taking. Further, there is a dearth 
6 
 
of performance-based measurement to assess affective empathy. The empathy literature 
has long relied on self-report instruments, both in the general population and in 
schizophrenia studies. However, performance-based paradigms have some distinct 
advantages over self-report instruments that assess respondents’ perceptions, rather than 
actual performance or skills (“trait” empathy, according to Lee et al., 2015). Indeed, 
research has shown that people with schizophrenia tend to overestimate their empathic 
abilities on self-report measures as compared to reports from informants (Bora, Gökçen, 
& Veznedaroglu, 2008) or clinical observers (Lysaker, Hasson-Ohayon, Kravetz, Kent, & 
Roe, 2013). Thus, there is a need for performance-based measures of empathy that 
capture both cognitive and affective components.  
Two performance-based paradigms have emerged that purport to measure 
cognitive and affective empathy. First, a comic strip task developed by Völlm and 
colleagues (2006) has recently undergone slight modification to include an affective 
component (Benedetti et al., 2009; Lee et al., 2010). While the goal to assess both is 
laudable, the task’s assessment of affective empathy still relies heavily on the ability to 
cognitively infer emotional components of the comic strip story and characters, and the 
cognitive empathy task does not assess emotional perspective-taking. In contrast, the 
Derntl paradigm (Derntl et al., 2009) assesses emotional perspective-taking (cognitive 
empathy), affective responsiveness (used as a proxy for affective empathy in past 
literature), and emotion recognition. As the cognitive empathy task in this paradigm 
focuses exclusively on emotional perspective-taking, it is highly relevant to empathic 
interaction. The affective empathy task asks for respondents to indicate their own 
emotional responses to emotionally-laden sentences. Although the statements are self-
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oriented, rather than oriented toward the other, the assessment of normative emotional 
responses relies less heavily on cognitive interpretation than the comic strip task 
described above. Thus, of the two options, the Derntl paradigm is more promising as an 
integrative, performance-based empathy assessment (see additional description of this 
task in the Methods section). The Derntl paradigm has been used three times in 
schizophrenia samples (Derntl, Finkelmeyer, et al., 2012; Derntl, Seidel, Schneider, & 
Habel, 2012; Smith et al., 2014), but additional work with this paradigm is needed to 
confirm its utility and extend performance-based empathy findings in schizophrenia. 
Variables Impacting Empathy 
Personal Distress & Emotion Regulation 
Personal distress in response to others’ distress, sometimes called emotional 
contagion (Preston & De Waal, 2002), has been implicated as an area of potential 
importance for empathic interaction in people with schizophrenia. Personal distress refers 
to the experience of self-oriented distress resulting from unpleasant emotions such as 
anxiety or fear when faced with negative experiences of others (Davis, 1983). While 
people with schizophrenia typically exhibit decreased empathy, the same samples reveal 
heightened personal distress when confronted with others’ situations or emotions 
(Bonfils, Lysaker, Minor, & Salyers, 2017). Similarly, a meta-analysis of studies 
examining emotional experience in people with schizophrenia (Cohen & Minor, 2010) 
found that although schizophrenia participants reported similar levels of positive 
emotions to healthy controls, aversive emotional experience was heightened in response 
to neutral or even positive stimuli. As suggested by Horan et al. (2015) and Bonfils et al. 
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(2017), experiencing heightened negative emotions, leading to personal distress, may 
impede the ability of people with schizophrenia to empathically respond.  
Although personal distress is not considered an actual component of empathy in 
most conceptualizations (e.g., see Jolliffe & Farrington, 2004; Vachon, Lynam, & 
Johnson, 2014), distress is clearly related to empathy. The most frequently used self-
report measure of empathy, the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1983), 
includes a personal distress subscale, as does a more recently developed self-report 
measure of empathy, the Questionnaire of Cognitive and Affective Empathy (the 
emotional contagion subscale; Michaels et al., 2014; Reniers, Corcoran, Drake, Shryane, 
& Völlm, 2011). Furthermore, several prominent theorists have included personal distress 
in their conceptualizations of the empathic process. For example, personal distress has 
been described as affect sharing, similar to that seen in affective empathy, but without a 
distinction between the self and the other (thought by some to be the third component of 
empathy; see discussion of regulatory mechanisms above), resulting in self-oriented 
distress rather than an empathic reaction (De Vignemont & Singer, 2006; Decety & 
Jackson, 2006; Preston & De Waal, 2002). In this way, personal distress itself would not 
be a component of empathy, but could contribute to whether or not one engages in 
successful empathic interaction. 
Despite the plethora of research showing heightened personal distress in people 
with schizophrenia, and suggestions from empathy theorists regarding the origin of 
personal distress within empathy models, the mechanism through which this occurs and 
its impact on empathy have yet to be empirically investigated. Some schizophrenia 
researchers have suggested that the heightened negative emotions experienced by people 
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with schizophrenia may result from a failure to downregulate negative emotions (Cohen 
& Minor, 2010; Horan, Green, Kring, & Nuechterlein, 2006; Horan et al., 2015), 
indicating an explanatory role for emotion regulation in empathic deficits in 
schizophrenia. Emotion regulation -- the processes involved in monitoring, evaluating, 
and altering emotions in order to achieve one’s goals (Thompson, 1994) -- is often 
impaired in individuals with schizophrenia (O'Driscoll, Laing, & Mason, 2014). Deficits 
have been found for use of cognitive emotion regulation strategies (O'Driscoll et al., 
2014) and directed attention (Strauss et al., 2015), and studies find increased presence of 
alexithymia (Van't Wout, Aleman, Bermond, & Kahn, 2007). In the context of Gross’ 
(2015) extended process model of emotion regulation, people with schizophrenia may fail 
to adequately downregulate negative emotion at any stage of the model (i.e., situation, 
attention, appraisal, or response); as such, inadequate emotion regulation may result in 
overpowering negative emotions felt in an empathic context, interfering with the ability 
to appraise the thoughts, behaviors, and emotions of others (i.e., failure to appropriately 
use attentional deployment, cognitive change, or response modulation techniques; Gross, 
2015). This idea of down-regulation failure aligns with one group of researchers who 
posit emotion regulation is actually the third component of empathy, alongside affective 
and cognitive empathy (Decety & Jackson, 2006). In addition to hindering empathic 
interaction, unpleasant self-oriented feelings could potentially drive people with 
schizophrenia to withdraw from interpersonal interactions because of discomfort. Yet, 
despite evidence indicating the potential importance of emotion regulation, speculations 
regarding the relationship between emotion regulation and empathy in people with 
schizophrenia have not been empirically examined. 
10 
 
Metacognition 
In addition to emotion regulation, another key factor in regulating emotions and 
empathic response is metacognition – the ability to think about one’s own thinking and 
the thinking of others. This can be at a discrete level of specific mental experiences, or at 
a more synthetic level where intentions, thoughts, and feelings are brought together into 
integrated representations of self and others (Lysaker, Vohs, et al., 2013; Semerari et al., 
2003). Several studies indicate deficits in metacognition for people with schizophrenia 
(Hasson-Ohayon et al., 2015; Rabin et al., 2014; Vohs et al., 2014); this deficit seems to 
be unique to the disorder, as findings indicate people with schizophrenia have reduced 
metacognitive capacity not just as compared to healthy controls, but also as compared to 
people with other psychiatric conditions, including bipolar disorder (Tas, Brown, 
Aydemir, Brüne, & Lysaker, 2014), anxiety or depression (WeiMing, Yi, Lysaker, & Kai, 
2015), post-traumatic stress disorder (Lysaker et al., 2015), and addictions (Lysaker, 
Leonhardt, Brüne, et al., 2014).  
The term metacognition was originally used in the education literature (Flavell, 
1979), but has evolved in its use to now encompass a spectrum of psychological 
functions. As used in schizophrenia research, the term metacognition typically refers to 
the ability to think about the thoughts and feelings of oneself and others and integrate this 
knowledge to make meaning of the world and one’s connections within it (Lysaker & 
Hasson-Ohayon, 2014). Metacognition is commonly understood to have four domains: 
self-reflectivity - the ability to understand one’s own thoughts and feelings; 
understanding of others’ minds - the ability to understand others’ thoughts and feelings; 
decentration - the ability to interpret the world and others’ actions as independent from 
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oneself; and mastery - the ability to use skills in the first three domains to respond to 
psychological and social problems (Lysaker et al., 2005; Lysaker, Leonhardt, Pijnenborg, 
et al., 2014). The metacognition construct contains several elements associated with 
empathy – the ability to understand the thoughts and feelings of others, the ability to 
understand one’s own thoughts and feelings (and that they are separate from others), and 
the ability to respond in an appropriate manner to others in a social setting are all integral 
to empathic interaction. Perhaps most importantly, metacognition may play a role in the 
interpretation of affect felt upon seeing another in distress, perhaps determining if the 
affect leads to personal distress or to empathic interaction with the other. 
Despite the plausible connection between metacognition and empathy, there is a 
dearth of research investigating the intersection of these two constructs. I was able to 
locate only one study directly examining the empirical link between metacognition and 
empathy in schizophrenia. This study found positive correlations between the overall 
metacognition score and cognitive and affective empathy (but not personal distress; 
WeiMing et al., 2015). Outside of schizophrenia research, theoretical and empirical 
literature links metacognition with emotion regulation. For example, in the 
psychodynamic literature, “mentalized affectivity” refers to a type of emotion regulation 
in which awareness and experience of the emotion coincide, allowing attribution of 
appropriate emotional meaning to the experience, and bringing together the 
metacognitive and emotion regulation constructs (Fonagy, Gergely, & Jurist, 2004). 
Metacognition has also been linked to emotion regulation in affective neuroscience and 
cognitive literatures. For example, Wells’ (2002) metacognitive theory focuses on the 
impact of thinking about one’s own thinking on emotion regulatory strategies, and 
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negative metacognitive beliefs (based on Wells’ theory) are significantly associated with 
emotion dysregulation (Mazloom, Yaghubi, & Mohammadkhani, 2016). Neuroscientific 
studies examining regulation of emotions, thoughts, and behaviors also point to the 
importance of accurate appraisal of others’ mental states as well as the ability to 
reinterpret or reappraise the behavior of others (Ochsner, 2008; Olsson & Ochsner, 
2008). Lastly, Gumley (2011) posited that decreased metacognitive capacities coupled 
with dysfunctional emotion regulation could play an important role in the 
symptomatology of mental disorders.  
The Current Study 
Taken together, evidence indicates the importance of metacognition in the ability 
to regulate emotions (and mitigate personal distress), which may in turn be key to 
effective empathic interactions, though no study to my knowledge has investigated these 
relationships. Thus, the aim of the proposed project was to determine the roles of emotion 
regulation, personal distress, and metacognition in predicting empathic performance in 
people with schizophrenia. Based on prior research, I hypothesized the following:  
1) Stronger metacognition and emotion regulation skills, and lower personal 
distress would be associated with better empathic performance (both cognitive 
and affective).  
2) Emotion regulation would mediate the relationship between personal distress 
and cognitive and affective empathy.  
3) Metacognition would moderate the relationships between personal distress and 
cognitive and affective empathy, such that with higher metacognitive skills, the 
relationships between personal distress and cognitive and affective empathy are 
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nonsignificant, while at lower levels of metacognitive skill, personal distress 
would significantly predict poorer cognitive and affective empathic performance.  
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METHOD 
Participants 
 Participants included 58 clients receiving mental health services with diagnoses of 
schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder. This number ensured adequate statistical power 
for regression analyses, per a G*Power analysis (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 
2007) indicating a minimum sample size of 55 guarantees 0.8 power to detect medium 
effects (in a regression with up to 7 predictors). Participants were required to be at least 
18, fluent in English, able to provide informed consent, and receiving services at a 
participating community mental health center (Midtown Mental Health Center or Four 
County Counseling Center).  
Measures  
Following informed consent, participants were administered a modified version of 
the Structured Clinical Interview for the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual-5 (SCID-5; 
First, Williams, Karg, & Spitzer, 2015), specifically assessing psychotic and mood 
symptoms, to confirm schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder diagnoses. A 
demographic questionnaire was then administered.  
Empathy. The computerized, performance-based Derntl paradigm (Derntl et al., 
2009) adapted for the English language (Smith et al., 2014) was administered using the 
program Presentation ("Presentation Version 18.2 [Computer software]," 2016). The 
Derntl paradigm is a forced-choice, timed, computer-based assessment of empathy 
producing three subscale scores that reflect different empathic components. To assess 
emotion perception, respondents must select the emotion felt by a target image using the 
image’s facial expression only (i.e., a face without context is presented) for 30 faces. 
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Images portray faces expressing one of five emotions (fear, anger, sadness, disgust, or 
happiness), or portray neutral expressions (Derntl et al., 2009). The facial image is 
presented with two answer choices (on either side of the face, corresponding with correct 
arrow key choices) for a maximum of 5 seconds. To assess cognitive empathy (referred 
to in this paradigm as emotional perspective-taking), respondents are shown 57 
contextual images of two actors engaged in social interaction. One actor’s face is masked, 
and respondents are required to select the appropriate facial emotion image that would 
portray the actor’s emotion in the scene. Respondents are first shown the image for 4 
seconds, followed by a response slide that presents 2 face choices, available for up to 4 
seconds pending arrow key response. To assess affective empathy (referred to in this 
paradigm as affective responsiveness), respondents are asked to judge how they would 
feel in various emotional scenarios, presented as 150 brief sentences describing emotional 
and neutral situations. The written sentence is first displayed for 6 seconds, followed by a 
response slide with 2 emotion face choices, available for up to 4 seconds pending arrow 
key response. Correct choices for this task reflect the emotion most people would feel for 
the given scenario (i.e., the normative response; Smith et al., 2014). Across tasks in the 
Derntl paradigm, facial images come from a standardized stimulus set (Gur et al., 2002), 
and incorrect options are randomized across emotional conditions (Derntl et al., 2009; 
Smith et al., 2014).  
Personal Distress. The Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1983) was 
used to assess personal distress. The IRI contains 28 Likert-style self-report items rated 
from 0 (does not describe me well) to 4 (describes me very well). The IRI is designed to 
produce four subscale scores (each based on 7 items): personal distress, empathic 
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concern, perspective-taking, and fantasy (Davis, 1983). Primary interest in this study lies 
in the personal distress subscale. The IRI personal distress subscale was developed for 
use in the general population and displayed adequate convergent and divergent validity 
and good internal consistency in the original development study (Davis, 1983). The IRI 
has since been used extensively in schizophrenia samples (e.g., see Fujino et al., 2014; 
Horan, Pineda, Wynn, Iacoboni, & Green, 2014; Montag et al., 2012; Singh et al., 2015). 
It should be noted that internal consistency was low in the current sample (α = .56).  
Emotion Regulation. Emotion regulation was assessed with the Difficulties in 
Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS; Gratz & Roemer, 2004). This self-report questionnaire 
was designed to comprehensively assess emotion regulatory abilities and has 36 Likert-
style items, producing an overall score and six subscale scores: non-acceptance of 
emotional responses, difficulties engaging in goal-directed behavior, impulse control 
difficulties, lack of emotional awareness, limited access to emotion regulation strategies, 
and lack of emotional clarity. Items are rated from 1 (almost never) to 5 (almost always). 
Primary interest in this study lies in the overall emotion dysregulation score. The DERS 
overall score shows evidence of good internal consistency, test-retest reliability, and 
construct validity in general population samples (Gratz & Roemer, 2004) and in samples 
of people diagnosed with psychotic disorders (Owens, Haddock, & Berry, 2013). Internal 
consistency of the total score was strong in this sample (α = .93). 
Metacognition. Metacognition was assessed using the Metacognition Assessment 
Scale-Abbreviated (MAS-A; Lysaker et al., 2005), an interview-based observer-rated 
scale. The MAS-A assesses metacognitive capacity through verbalization, producing a 
total score and four subscale scores: self-reflectivity, awareness of others’ minds, 
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decentration, and mastery (Lysaker et al., 2010). Primary interest in this study lies in the 
total metacognitive capacity score. Past evidence indicates the MAS-A total score has 
good validity (Lysaker, Leonhardt, Pijnenborg, et al., 2014), internal consistency 
(Lysaker, Dimaggio, Buck, Carcione, & Nicolò, 2007), and inter-rater reliability (Lysaker 
et al., 2010) in individuals with schizophrenia-spectrum disorders. Internal consistency 
was acceptable in this sample (α = .70) 
The Indiana Psychiatric Illness Interview (IPII; Lysaker, Clements, Plascak-
Hallberg, Knipscheer, & Wright, 2002), a semi-structured interview designed to elicit 
illness narratives, was administered to produce ratings for the MAS-A. The IPII was 
designed to probe for information about how participants view their lives and mental 
disorders. The IPII generally lasts around 30 minutes, although the interview length may 
vary greatly based on the narrative provided. The IPII has been used in several studies of 
people with schizophrenia (e.g., see Hasson-Ohayon et al., 2015; Lysaker et al., 2011; 
Salyers, Matthias, Sidenbender, & Green, 2013; Vohs et al., 2014). The IPII was audio-
recorded, saved to a secure server, transcribed, and de-identified prior to coding with the 
MAS-A. 
Symptoms. Symptoms were assessed using the observer-rated Positive and 
Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS; Kay, Fiszbein, & Opler, 1987). Five-factor scoring 
of the 30-item PANSS produces a total score plus five subscale scores: positive 
symptoms, negative symptoms, cognitive symptoms, hostility, and emotional discomfort 
(Bell, Lysaker, Beam-Goulet, Milstein, & Lindenmayer, 1994). The PANSS has been 
used extensively in schizophrenia research in the past (e.g., see Firmin, Luther, Lysaker, 
& Salyers, 2015; Luther, Lysaker, Firmin, Breier, & Vohs, 2015; Owens et al., 2013), 
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and shows evidence of acceptable validity, inter-rater reliability, and internal consistency 
(Bell et al., 1994; Kay et al., 1987). Internal consistency of the total and five subscale 
scores were adequate in this sample (alphas range between .68 and .85 – see Table 1). 
Procedure 
 Recruitment. Participants were recruited from two local community mental 
health centers (CMHCs) – Midtown Mental Health Center and Four County Counseling 
Center. Clinicians at each CMHC were asked to inform eligible clients that the study was 
available and provide informational brochures to potential participants. At Four County 
Counseling Center, this was the sole recruitment method. At Midtown, fliers with contact 
information, a brief study description (including eligibility requirements), and 
information about compensation were placed in approved positions directing interested 
clients to contact the author to learn more or participate in the study. Once a client 
contacted the author about participation, a brief phone screen was conducted and an 
interview time was scheduled. Reminder calls were provided. 
Interview. Each assessment began with the informed consent process. 
Participants were asked to read the informed consent document; the interviewer then 
asked that the participant state back in their own words their understanding of what 
would happen during the course of the study to ensure adequate comprehension. 
Participants were allowed to ask any questions they had prior to signing the consent form 
and/or starting the interview. Immediately following the informed consent process, 
diagnostic confirmation was obtained via the SCID-5. If the participant did not meet 
inclusion criteria (no diagnosis of schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder), the 
participant was given $5 and the interview concluded. This occurred for three potential 
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participants. If the participant met inclusion criteria, a demographic survey was 
administered, followed by the battery of assessments, ending with the IPII. Following the 
assessment, participants received $35. All interviews were conducted by a trained 
doctoral student or research assistant. Interviews were most often completed in 2-3 hours.   
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ANALYSES 
 Prior to any analyses, data were entered into SPSS, checked, and cleaned. IPII 
interviews were transcribed and de-identified prior to MAS-A coding. Coding was 
conducted by trained research assistants and practicum students supervised by Dr. Paul 
Lysaker at the Richard L. Roudebush VAMC. All MAS-A coders underwent training to 
ensure adequate reliability in MAS-A ratings prior to coding transcripts for this study. 
MAS-A scores were entered into SPSS and checked once coding was completed. 
 Descriptive statistics were conducted first, followed by the Shapiro-Wilk test of 
normality. Tests of normality tend to be overly sensitive to sample size, including the 
Shapiro-Wilk test. However, this test is often preferred over other normality tests based 
on the results of simulation studies (e.g., see Yap & Sim, 2011), and thus was used here 
in conjunction with examination of skewness and kurtosis values. Bivariate correlations, 
t-tests, and analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were then conducted to assess for 
associations between scores on empathy tasks, symptoms, and demographic variables. 
Results of these analyses were used to select appropriate control variables. 
To test the first hypothesis, bivariate correlations examined associations between 
scores on the empathy tasks and: 1) personal distress; 2) emotion regulation; and 3) 
metacognition, with the expectation that greater emotion regulation and metacognition 
and reduced personal distress would be associated with better empathic performance. 
Secondary hierarchical regressions were conducted to assess the predictive value of each 
variable when controlling for relevant demographic and symptom covariates.  
Proposed mediating and moderating relationships were tested using Hayes’ 
PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2013), which conducts ordinary least squares (OLS) regression 
21 
 
analyses. To assess whether emotion regulation (M) mediated the relationship between 
personal distress (X) and cognitive empathy (Y), I tested the indirect effect (a*b) of 
personal distress on cognitive empathy through emotion regulation. The PROCESS 
macro conducted the following two OLS regressions to test this model: 1) emotion 
regulation (M) was regressed onto personal distress (X) to produce a; and 2) cognitive 
empathy was regressed onto both emotion regulation (M) and personal distress (X) to 
produce b and c’ (the direct effect). Emotion regulation was considered to mediate the 
relationship between personal distress and cognitive empathy if the indirect effect of 
personal distress on cognitive empathy through emotion regulation (a*b) was significant, 
using a bias-corrected 95% bootstrap confidence interval with 10,000 bootstrap samples 
(i.e., the confidence interval did not contain a value of zero). Of note, the presence of an 
association between X and Y is not required for there to be an indirect effect (Hayes, 
2013); thus, mediation models were run even in the absence of such associations. This 
procedure was repeated to assess whether emotion regulation mediated the relationship 
between personal distress and affective empathy. 
To assess whether metacognition (M) moderated the relationship between 
personal distress (X) and cognitive empathy (Y), the interaction term (XM) was added to 
the OLS regression model predicting cognitive empathy. If the interaction term was 
significant (p < .05) and significantly improved the regression model, metacognition was 
considered to moderate the relationship between personal distress and cognitive empathy. 
Of note, unstandardized, non-centered data were entered into the moderation model. 
While some statisticians recommend centering or standardizing data for analyses that use 
the product of X and M (e.g., see Aiken, West, & Reno, 1991; Cohen, Cohen, West, & 
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Aiken, 2003), Hayes (2013) argues that these procedures are not necessary and have little 
to no effect on the average data used for moderation analyses.  
If significant moderation was detected, two techniques were employed to probe 
the interaction. First, the pick-a-point approach (Rogosa, 1980) was used to visualize any 
moderation detected. In this analysis, values of the moderator (metacognition) are chosen 
at which to graphically represent the relationship between X (personal distress) and Y 
(cognitive empathy); typically these values are plus and minus one standard deviation 
from the mean. Second, the Johnson-Neyman technique (Bauer & Curran, 2005) was 
used to identify the actual value of the moderator (metacognition) where the relationship 
between X and Y changed significance (Hayes, 2013). This procedure was repeated to 
assess whether metacognition moderated the relationship between personal distress and 
affective empathy. See conceptual models for both hypothesized interactions in Figures 1 
and 2. All analyses were conducted in SPSS version 24. 
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RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
 See Table 2 for detailed descriptive statistics characterizing the demographic 
composition of the sample. More than half of the participants had schizophrenia and were 
female. Most participants were black, and nearly all were single or divorced. One third 
reported not having received their high school diploma or GED, but nearly 40% reported 
having attended some college. Most were unemployed and received Social Security 
benefits, but a quarter reported current, paid employment. Participants reported a wide 
variety of living arrangements, but most were living independently and had relatively 
stable housing. The sample age averaged 46.6 years, but there was wide variation, 
ranging from 25 to 65. The vast majority of participants completed the entire testing 
battery with good effort, but in two cases, data was removed for selected measures based 
on lack of apparent effort or ability (self-report scales removed for participant 104; Derntl 
tasks removed for participant 111).  
 See Table 1 for descriptive statistics of each scale used in analyses, along with 
symptoms. Emotion regulation, personal distress, metacognition, and cognitive and 
affective empathy performance all displayed characteristics consistent with normally 
distributed data, producing non-significant results for the Shapiro-Wilk test of normality 
and skew and kurtosis estimates less than an absolute value of one.  In light of these 
results, the data presented here were considered appropriate for the planned parametric 
tests.  
 Data were also examined for outliers on the scales of interest (personal distress, 
emotion regulation, metacognition, and empathy tasks). One outlier was found for 
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personal distress (participant 152). This person was the only participant to report 
experiencing no personal distress (i.e., a score of 0), placing them nearly 3 standard 
deviations outside the mean. However, it is possible that this participant truly perceived 
that they do not experience personal distress, making a score of 0 valid for this 
participant. Thus, all analyses were run with and without this case. Any differences in 
results between analyses with and without participant 152 are discussed below. 
Tests for Possible Covariates 
All demographic and symptom variables were examined for associations with 
Derntl paradigm scores to determine which, if any, should be included as control 
variables in further analyses. Among demographic variables, the emotional perspective-
taking task was only associated with age (r = -.34, p = .01). The affective responsiveness 
task did not exhibit an association with age, but did show mean differences for both race 
(t(53) = -2.67, p = .01) and marital status (F(2, 54) = 3.20, p = .049), such that white 
participants scored significantly higher than black participants, and those who were 
divorced or separated scored significantly higher than those who were single (never 
married). For both tasks, results suggested those with schizoaffective disorder performed 
significantly better than those with schizophrenia (Cognitive empathy: t(55) = -2.29, p = 
.026; Affective empathy: t(55) = -2.65, p = .011).  
See Table 3 for results of correlation analyses examining associations between 
empathy tasks and symptoms. Both empathy tasks displayed moderate, negative 
correlations with cognitive symptoms, suggesting increased cognitive deficits are 
associated with decreased performance on these empathic tasks. Performance on the 
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cognitive empathy task was further negatively associated with negative symptoms, and 
performance on the affective empathy task was negatively associated with hostility. 
Associations among Relevant Variables 
 Correlations were conducted to assess bivariate associations among study 
variables and address hypothesis one, that better emotion regulation and metacognition, 
and reduced personal distress, would be associated with improved performance on the 
empathy tasks. As can be seen in Table 3, empathy performance tasks correlated strongly 
with one another, but not so strongly that we might expect issues with multicollinearity 
(i.e., r < .80). Both tasks also displayed moderate, positive correlations with 
metacognition, suggesting increased empathic performance is associated with greater 
metacognitive capacity. At the bivariate level, neither empathy task was significantly 
correlated with either emotion regulation or personal distress, though personal distress 
was strongly correlated with emotion regulation. None of the above results changed when 
participant 152 was removed. 
 To further clarify the answer to hypothesis one, a series of regressions were 
conducted to assess predictive relationships while controlling for potentially confounding 
variables. Results for the cognitive empathy task can be seen in Table 4. As in bivariate 
correlation results, personal distress and emotion regulation did not significantly predict 
cognitive empathy performance, but metacognition did predict cognitive empathy 
performance, even with relevant symptom and demographic variables controlled (i.e., 
diagnosis, age, cognitive symptoms, and negative symptoms). For affective empathy 
performance (Table 5), neither personal distress nor emotion regulation were predictive. 
Metacognition was predictive when entered alone in the first step, but when control 
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variables were added (diagnosis, race, marital status, cognitive symptoms, and hostility), 
it was reduced to trend-level significance (p = .093). 
Mediation Models 
 Mediation models were conducted to test hypothesis two, that emotion regulation 
would mediate the relationship between personal distress and empathic task performance. 
Two models were tested for cognitive empathy performance – one with no control 
variables, and one controlling for diagnosis, age, cognitive symptoms, and negative 
symptoms (see Table 6). Interpretation of results did not differ between the two models. 
In both cases, an indirect effect was not apparent, as 95% confidence intervals both 
included a value of 0, inferring there is a possibility that the effect is 0.  
Results for affective empathy performance can be seen in Table 7. Two models 
were also tested for this task – one with no control variables, and one controlling for 
diagnosis, race, marital status, cognitive symptoms, and hostility. For the first model, 
results were similar to those seen for the cognitive empathy task – i.e., no indirect effect 
was evident, as the bootstrapped confidence interval contained a possible value of 0. 
However, when control variables were added to the model, an indirect effect of emotion 
regulation on affective empathy became apparent. In this model, participants who 
reported increased personal distress also reported reduced ability to regulate emotion (a = 
0.52, p < .001), which in turn led to increased scores on the affective empathy task (b = 
5.51, p = .075). Personal distress indirectly influences affective empathy performance 
through the mechanism of emotion regulation (point estimate of indirect effect = 2.86, 
95% CI [0.31, 6.95]). After accounting for this indirect effect, personal distress had no 
direct effect on affective empathy performance (c’ = -2.05, p = .443). Of note, the 
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direction of the effect of emotion regulation on affective empathy performance (the b 
path) is opposite of that hypothesized – suggesting that reduced ability to regulate 
emotion is associated with better performance in this data. All mediation results were the 
same when conducted without participant 152, the outlier for personal distress. 
Moderation Models 
 See Table 8 for moderation results for cognitive empathy performance. Two 
models were conducted, both with and without control variables of diagnosis, age, 
cognitive symptoms, and negative symptoms. Though the moderation model without 
control variables was significant, no single predictor reached significance, including the 
interaction term. When control variables were added, metacognition, age, and cognitive 
symptoms reached significance as predictors, but the interaction term remained non-
significant, suggesting that metacognition does not moderate the relationship between 
personal distress and cognitive empathy performance in this data. 
 See Table 9 for moderation results for affective empathy performance. As for 
cognitive empathy performance, models were conducted both with and without control 
variables (diagnosis, race, marital status, cognitive symptoms, and hostility). Similar to 
cognitive empathy performance, in the model without control variables, the overall model 
was significant, but no single predictor reached significance. However, when control 
variables were added to the model, metacognition, personal distress, race, marital status, 
cognitive symptoms, and hostility were all significant predictors. Importantly, the 
interaction term also reached significance (p = .027), suggesting the relationship between 
personal distress and affective empathy performance is moderated by metacognition. The 
pick-a-point approach provides a useful graphic with which to understand this 
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relationship (visualized in Figure 3). Results of the Johnson-Neyman procedure revealed 
that the critical value of metacognition is 9.84. For those with scores of 9.84 or higher, 
personal distress does not affect one’s affective empathy performance. But, for those with 
metacognition scores lower than 9.84, increased personal distress was associated with 
better affective empathy performance. This finding is contrary to the hypothesized 
direction of this effect. In this sample, 87% of participants had metacognition scores 
above 9.84.  
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DISCUSSION 
 This study is the first to my knowledge to investigate the roles of three primary 
predictors in performance-based empathy – personal distress, emotion regulation, and 
metacognition. Results indicate that, at the bivariate level, metacognition is significantly, 
positively associated with performance on both cognitive and affective empathy tasks; 
personal distress and emotion regulation did not display significant correlations. These 
results held up for cognitive empathy in multivariate analyses, suggesting metacognition 
is an important predictor of cognitive empathic performance. For affective empathy, 
metacognition was reduced to a trend-level predictor when control variables were added, 
perhaps suggesting a more important role for demographic or symptom variables. 
Mediation analyses revealed a mediating role of emotion regulation in the relationship 
between personal distress and affective empathy performance, but not cognitive empathy 
performance. Lastly, moderation analyses found metacognition moderates the 
relationship between personal distress and affective empathy performance, but not 
cognitive empathy performance. Contrary to hypotheses, this moderating relationship 
suggests that increased personal distress improves affective empathy performance for 
those with low metacognition. 
How do Personal Distress, Emotion Regulation, and Metacognition Impact 
Empathy? 
 Though the literature suggests each of these constructs – personal distress, 
emotion regulation, and metacognition – may be important to empathic performance, this 
data indicates metacognition may be the most important of these factors in determining 
empathic performance. Metacognition was positively associated with both cognitive and 
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affective empathy performance in correlational analyses, to the order of a medium effect 
size, suggesting that those with better metacognition may be more able to accurately 
respond during an empathy task. While the construct definitions certainly suggest a likely 
connection between metacognition and empathy (Lysaker et al., 2005; Lysaker, 
Leonhardt, Pijnenborg, et al., 2014), only one study had thus far examined the link 
between these two constructs (WeiMing et al., 2015). That study used a self-report 
empathy measure, so results can be interpreted to support a link between metacognitive 
abilities and perceived empathic tendencies (termed “trait” empathy by others in the field; 
Lee et al., 2015) rather than performance. The current study extends those findings by 
linking metacognition with performance-based cognitive and affective empathy, 
suggesting that observer-rated metacognitive abilities may have an impact on real-world 
empathic interactions. This is an important extension, as research shows that people with 
schizophrenia may tend to overestimate their own empathic tendencies on self-report 
measures (Bora et al., 2008; Lysaker, Hasson-Ohayon, et al., 2013), and studies 
examining the relationships between self-report and performance-based measures tend to 
find low or nonexistent associations (Derntl et al., 2009; Derntl, Seidel, et al., 2012; Lee, 
Zaki, Harvey, Ochsner, & Green, 2011; Regenbogen et al., 2015).  
 While both cognitive and affective empathy performance were associated with 
metacognition at the bivariate level, this association may be more robust for cognitive 
empathy performance when confounding variables are controlled. In a multivariate 
regression analysis controlling for diagnosis, age, and cognitive and negative symptoms, 
metacognition was still highly significant as a predictor of cognitive empathy 
performance. For affective empathy performance, when controlling for diagnosis, race, 
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marital status, cognitive symptoms, and hostility, metacognition was only predictive at 
the trend level (p = .093). This is likely not an effect of reduced power to detect effects, 
as G*Power (Faul et al., 2007) indicates a sample of 55 is adequate to detect medium 
effects in a multiple regression analysis with such specifications.  
Revisiting the definition of metacognition, it may make sense that metacognition 
is a more robust predictor for cognitive empathy performance than for affective empathy 
performance. Metacognition is essentially the ability to think about and integrate one’s 
own mental experiences and those of others (Lysaker, Vohs, et al., 2013; Semerari et al., 
2003), including both thoughts and emotions. Cognitive empathy is a construct closely 
akin to this definition, focused on knowing and understanding the thoughts and emotions 
of others (Decety & Jackson, 2004). However, affective empathy is less about knowing 
the other’s feelings and more about experiencing your own reciprocal emotion. While 
metacognitive abilities would certainly be important in interpreting the other’s emotion 
and in understanding the context of one’s felt emotion, the actual experience of emotion 
itself is not part of the metacognition construct. Thus, the more robust relationship 
between metacognition and cognitive empathy performance aligns well with the literature 
and the field’s understanding of these two constructs.  
Taken together, these findings suggest metacognition may play a central role in 
predicting empathic performance. Thus, interventions designed to enhance metacognitive 
capacities may also benefit empathic performance. One intervention of particular 
promise, Metacognitive Reflection and Insight Therapy (MERIT; Van Donkersgoed et 
al., 2014), was developed to align with the metacognitive components measured by the 
MAS-A (self-reflectivity, awareness of the other, decentration, and mastery), allowing 
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the intervention to be tailored to the metacognitive level of the client. Indeed, MERIT 
was designed specifically for people with schizophrenia, suggesting MERIT may be 
particularly appropriate to address the empathic deficits seen in this group while also 
enhancing metacognition. Improving empathic performance through such an intervention 
has potential to positively influence social functioning and the quality of interpersonal 
relationships, both of which are related to empathy (Bechi et al., 2017; Hofelich & 
Preston, 2012; Van den Brink et al., 2012). Future work should continue to explore the 
relationships between metacognition and both cognitive and affective empathy and how 
they may be impacted by particular interventions. 
 Surprisingly, neither personal distress nor emotion regulation were associated 
with either empathy task at the bivariate or multivariate level (though emotion regulation 
reached trend level [p = .096] in the affective empathy model when controlling for 
diagnosis, race, marital status, cognitive symptoms, and hostility). These findings were 
contrary to hypotheses. Even though literature shows evidence of deficits in emotion 
regulation (O'Driscoll et al., 2014; Strauss et al., 2015) and heightened personal distress 
in those with schizophrenia (Bonfils et al., 2017), these constructs did not have an 
appreciable impact on cognitive or affective empathy performance.  
There are several possible explanations as to why these relationships did not 
appear in this data. First, of course, it is possible that these two variables truly do not 
have any impact on how an individual empathically performs. However, it seems more 
likely that measurement or other confounding variables prevented detection of an existing 
relationship. Measures of both emotion regulation and personal distress were self-reports, 
implying participants’ perception of their experiences with these constructs were being 
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measured, rather than their actual observer- or performance-based abilities or 
experiences. It is possible that participants’ perceptions vary from their real-world 
abilities, as is the case with empathy (Bonfils et al., 2016; Bora et al., 2008; Lysaker, 
Hasson-Ohayon, et al., 2013).  
Even if a participant’s perception of their emotion regulation and personal distress 
were accurate, it is possible that the Derntl paradigm tasks did not activate either an 
experience of personal distress or a need to regulate emotions, thus negating any effect of 
those variables on performance in this context. In the real world, empathic interactions 
would naturally be vastly more complex than those presented in the Derntl paradigm. 
Many elements go into each social interaction that impact our emotional responses – for 
example, one’s past relationship with the person for whom empathy is felt; the valence 
and seriousness of the scenario (e.g., life-threatening illness vs. celebrating a new baby 
vs. dropping your groceries on the sidewalk); ability to engage with the person; and pre-
existing events or emotions prior to the social interaction, among many other 
possibilities. It may be that these other elements, not simulated in the Derntl paradigm, 
are what triggers an experience of personal distress and/or the need to regulate one’s 
emotions, which can then interfere with empathy.  
Anecdotally, while completing the Derntl paradigm tasks during this study, a 
sizeable number of participants expressed emotion in response to the prompts. However, 
this almost always took the form of laughter, frequently in response to prompts meant to 
evoke disgust. Participants rarely seemed to share the emotions of the prompts for other 
categories (happiness, sadness, anger, or fear). In fact, due to the somewhat lengthy and 
tedious nature of these tasks, some participants expressed boredom or inquired as to when 
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the task would be finished. While this evidence is anecdotal and not systematic, it does 
suggest that the task is not particularly emotionally provocative. Indeed, it seems likely 
that participants were required to tap their cognitive or metacognitive skills (as evidenced 
by associations with those constructs) more so than they experienced emotion in response 
to the tasks. Thus, it is unlikely that participants experienced personal distress or needed 
to regulate emotions, perhaps obfuscating any effect those experiences would have had 
on real empathic interaction. Future research may want to investigate other ways to assess 
these interactions, such as using performance-based emotion regulation tasks or 
employing some sort of mood induction to invoke a mild form of personal distress prior 
to participation in empathy tasks. 
Does Emotion Regulation Mediate the Relationship between Personal Distress and 
Empathic Performance? 
 Though no correlations were found between personal distress and cognitive or 
affective empathy performance, Hayes (2013) points out that bivariate associations 
between the predictor and the outcome are not required for the presence of indirect 
effects. Thus, mediation models were still examined to address hypothesis two, that 
emotion regulation mediates the relationships between personal distress and cognitive 
and affective empathy performance. Against expectations, there was no evidence of 
mediation for cognitive empathy performance. However, in light of the discussion above 
about the lack of emotional provocation in the Derntl tasks, and the necessarily cognitive 
focus on knowing the thoughts and emotions of others in a cognitive empathy task, this 
finding fits well within the context of these results. 
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 While no mediation was evident for cognitive empathy performance, affective 
empathy performance showed evidence of an indirect effect of personal distress when 
controlling for diagnosis, race, marital status, cognitive symptoms, and hostility. This 
model suggests that personal distress indirectly affects affective empathy performance 
through the mechanism of emotion regulation. In practice, based on this result, we would 
expect that when someone with schizophrenia was presented with a situation wherein 
they might empathically interact, he or she might first feel personal distress, activating a 
need for emotion regulation skills, which then may exert influence on the empathic 
response, resulting in an indirect effect of the personal distress on empathy. Of note, in 
this model, the effect of emotion regulation on affective empathy performance (the b 
path) was positive. Considering the direction of scoring for the emotion regulation scale, 
the DERS, this suggests that reduced emotion regulatory abilities predict better affective 
empathy performance. The b path in this model only reached trending significance (p = 
.075) (as did emotion regulation in the multivariate prediction model discussed above, 
where the direction of the effect was the same), so we must be careful not to over-
interpret such a result. However, it is important to note that while mediation results 
suggest that emotion regulation does act as one mechanism through which personal 
distress impacts affective empathy performance, that mechanism may not operate as 
expected.  
 When interpreting these mediation results, it is important to consider the clinical 
implications of cognitive and affective empathy deficits, and that emotion regulation may 
be a mediator for one of these, but not the other. No research to my knowledge has yet 
been able to investigate how the different measured empathic components influence 
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actual empathic interaction in a schizophrenia sample. Future work is needed to parse 
apart the relative importance of cognitive and affective empathy for real-world social 
interactions. 
Does Metacognition Moderate the Relationship between Personal Distress and 
Empathic Performance? 
 Similar to the mediation models, moderation models revealed that metacognition 
does not have a moderating role in the relationship between personal distress and 
cognitive empathy performance. While metacognition seems to be an important variable 
in predicting cognitive empathy performance and most certainly merits investigation in 
future studies, it did not interact with personal distress to predict cognitive empathy 
performance in this data, suggesting the relationship between personal distress and 
cognitive empathy performance was relatively similar at all levels of metacognitive 
ability. 
 Results for affective empathy performance tell a different story. In a model 
controlling for other correlates (diagnosis, race, marital status, cognitive symptoms, and 
hostility), metacognition moderated the relationship between personal distress and 
affective empathy performance such that for those with low metacognition (less than a 
score of 9.84), increased experience of personal distress predicted better performance on 
the affective empathy task, and for those with higher metacognition (above a score of 
9.84), the relationship was non-significant. While the presence of moderation is 
consistent with hypotheses, the direction of the effect is not. It was expected that 
increased personal distress would hamper performance on empathy tasks, and likely 
actual empathic interaction as well. However, this data tells the opposite story – that 
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those who report experiencing greater personal distress were more able to accurately 
identify the normative response in the affective empathy task than those with lower 
reported personal distress, at least for those who are low in metacognition.  
While this relationship is unexpected, it is only present for a small proportion of 
the sample -- only 13% of participants had a metacognition score below the threshold of 
9.84 where this relationship becomes significant. Scores on the MAS-A range from 0 to 
28 and are comprised of the scores from four subscales (self-reflectivity, awareness of the 
other, decentration, and mastery). A score of 10 on the MAS-A could result from a 
variety of possible subscale scores but would generally suggest the participant is able to 
identify their own basic cognitive operations as well as those of others, but that the 
person has little or no ability to integrate that knowledge into a cohesive sense of self or 
understanding of how one interacts with the world and other people in it (Lysaker et al., 
2005; Lysaker, Leonhardt, Pijnenborg, et al., 2014). It is possible that once one moves 
toward being able to integrate internal experiences and develops a stronger sense of self, 
he or she becomes less reactive to internal experiences of distress, thus reducing any 
relationship between personal distress and affective empathy. Indeed, people with greater 
metacognition may be more able to ascertain the origin of a given emotion (the self vs. 
the other). In this way, metacognition may actually function as a self-regulatory 
mechanism, such as that referenced by some empathy scholars (De Vignemont & Singer, 
2006; Decety & Jackson, 2004; Wispé, 1986).  
Going further, it may be that at higher levels of metacognition, perception of 
personal distress changes, with the person becoming aware that internal, self-oriented 
distress is unpleasant and perhaps inappropriate in empathic interactions, leading to 
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potential interference with affective empathy. This story would seem to align somewhat 
with the data – as can be seen in Figure 3, the direction of the relationship between 
personal distress and affective empathy performance seems to change at higher levels of 
metacognition. In this data, the Johnson-Neyman technique identified only one region of 
significance (below a score of 9.84), but this could be the result of a restriction of range 
or a relatively small sample size. In testing for the critical value identified by the 
Johnson-Neyman technique, the PROCESS output identified trending significance for 
two values of metacognition, indicating a negative relationship between personal distress 
and affective empathy (M = 18.78; p = .094; M = 19.50, p = .081). As 19.50 was the 
highest metacognition score achieved by a participant in this sample, this data cannot tell 
us the relationship between personal distress and affective empathy performance for 
those with higher scores (MAS-A scores reach a maximum of 28). Considering the trend 
seen at higher values here, it seems reasonable to guess that the relationship would be 
significant and negative at even higher scores. This would suggest that personal distress 
interferes more with affective empathy for those with higher metacognition scores than 
for those with moderate scores, and that those with low scores actually receive some sort 
of enhancement to their affective empathy performance from experiencing personal 
distress. 
This leads to a discussion of the unexpected direction of such an effect – how 
could personal distress possibly convey a positive effect on performance? This question 
may, indeed, be integrally related to the finding above that reduced emotion regulation 
was trending toward an association with better performance on the affective empathy 
task. For both of these findings, the implications are that greater experience of negative 
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emotions and less ability to control them result in better affective empathy performance. 
This goes against the relationship posited by numerous scholars – that increased 
experience of negative emotion and inability to downregulate that emotion would 
interfere with empathic interaction (Cohen & Minor, 2010; Horan et al., 2006; Horan et 
al., 2015).  
One possible explanation for such unexpected findings could lie in the nature of 
the Derntl paradigm’s affective responsiveness task. As mentioned above, this task 
requires participants to respond to a sentence describing an emotional situation with how 
they would feel. It does not require participants to report the emotion they would feel 
were an emotional situation to happen to someone else. Thus, as the name suggests, the 
task may more accurately assess a construct such as emotional responsiveness, or 
emotionality. Those who experience more personal distress or have less success in 
regulating their emotions may naturally also experience more emotion, generally. This 
may convey some benefit in identifying normative emotional responses in the Derntl 
paradigm’s affective responsiveness task (though this relationship exists only at low 
levels of metacognition). Assuming that the task is truly a measure only of 
responsiveness, this would imply that those with moderate or higher levels of 
metacognition are able to rely more on their metacognitive abilities to accurately identify 
normative emotional responses, negating a need to rely on one’s own emotional 
experiences to do well on the task. For those with the highest levels of metacognition, it 
is possible that the experience of personal distress impedes the use of metacognitive 
abilities, leading to decreased accuracy; alternatively, there could be some other factor 
characteristic of people with increased personal distress and the highest levels of 
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metacognition that increases the difficulty of the affective responsiveness task. For 
example, it could be that knowledge and understanding of one’s own painful emotions 
makes it more uncomfortable to acknowledge these emotions in the context of such a 
task. 
While such an explanation makes sense in the context of these results, it also 
indicates that the Derntl paradigm affective responsiveness task may not assess true 
affective empathy, though it has been used to assess this construct in published studies 
(Derntl, Finkelmeyer, et al., 2012; Derntl, Seidel, et al., 2012; Smith et al., 2014). If this 
is the case, future research is needed in two main areas. First, additional development of 
performance-based affective empathy tasks is needed; and second, the hypotheses 
proposed herein should be examined with more robust measures. As discussed in the 
introduction, only two performance-based affective empathy tasks currently exist. Aside 
from the Derntl paradigm, a comic strip task has been modified to include an affective 
component (Benedetti et al., 2009; Lee et al., 2010), but this task relies quite heavily on 
cognitive interpretation of the comic strip and does not ask directly for the participants’ 
emotional experiences upon seeing the cartoon actor in an emotionally provocative 
situation. The Derntl paradigm was chosen for the current study because it relies less 
heavily on cognitive interpretation and asks directly for participants’ emotions, but the 
target of the prompts is the self, not the other, potentially negating its ability to assess 
empathy at all. An additional area of research concerns suppression of the mu rhythm, 
sometimes examined in electroencephalograph (EEG) studies of schizophrenia. The mu 
rhythm is thought to be a marker for the mirror neuron system, which some have 
suggested is the neurological mechanism underlying empathy (Decety, 2010a; Iacoboni, 
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2009). However, this literature is early in its development, and current studies are 
inconsistent in their findings in terms of both suppression of the mu rhythm in 
schizophrenia and associations between said suppression and self-report measures of 
empathy (e.g., see Brown, Gonzalez-Liencres, Tas, & Brune, 2016; Horan et al., 2014; 
McCormick et al., 2012). Further, one review found little evidence that we should assume 
the mirror neuron system is a critical component of emotion recognition processes, let 
alone empathy or sympathy (Decety, 2010b). Taken together, research on suppression of 
the mu rhythm needs additional work before it can be of value in ascertaining 
determinants of empathic deficits.  
Considering the state of the field, a sizable amount of research is needed to 
develop a robust measurement technique assessing affective empathy. One particular area 
of interest may lie in the direction of interactional tasks. Indeed, some research has begun 
to look at measuring theory of mind during interactions between participants with 
schizophrenia and study confederates (Achim, Parent, & Fossard, 2017). The field would 
certainly benefit from developing tasks along these lines to assess affective empathy, 
perhaps even asking about in-the-moment emotional experiences during or immediately 
after interaction with others. 
Returning to the unexpected direction of the results indicating that personal 
distress may enhance affective empathy performance for those low in metacognition – if 
we forge ahead with the assumption that the affective responsiveness task does, indeed, 
assess affective empathy performance, a second possible explanation for these findings 
could be that more intense internal experiences of emotion may foster greater empathic 
emotion felt for the other. Experiencing more frequent or intense negative, self-oriented 
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emotion may allow a person to develop greater understanding of what others might feel 
in emotionally provocative situations, and thus, allow that person to share the other’s 
emotion in an empathic manner more easily. This may be especially true for those with 
low metacognition who are otherwise less able to use cognitive resources to enhance their 
experience of empathic emotion. If this is the case, there are clinical implications of this 
finding. People with schizophrenia who have low metacognition may benefit from 
interventions designed to help them access and understand their own emotional 
experiences; such an intervention could have a trickle-down effect to help clients better 
identify and understand the emotions of others. 
A Word on Control Variables 
 While no specific hypotheses were put forth regarding the relationships between 
demographic or symptom variables and empathy tasks, some interesting findings did 
emerge. First, both diagnosis and cognitive symptoms were significantly associated with 
both types of empathy tasks. Some literature suggests those with schizophrenia 
experience greater deficits in social cognition than those with schizoaffective disorder 
(e.g., see Chen, Cataldo, Norton, & Ongur, 2012; Fiszdon, Richardson, Greig, & Bell, 
2007), so it may not be surprising that those with schizoaffective disorder performed 
better on both cognitive and affective empathy tasks. However, diagnosis was often not 
significant when entered in as a control variable in more complex models. Cognitive 
symptoms, on the other hand, remained significant or trending in every analysis, 
suggesting the relationship between cognitive deficits and performance on these tasks is 
strong and robust even when accounting for several other relevant variables. This is 
notable, as cognitive symptoms are common in schizophrenia. Past studies have not 
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acknowledged that the tasks may be cognitively taxing for some (Derntl et al., 2009; 
Derntl, Seidel, et al., 2012; Smith et al., 2014), but the results here suggest that cognitive 
deficits should be carefully considered when designing and using performance-based 
tasks of social cognition and empathy, specifically. Future work should investigate the 
impact of cognitive symptoms on other empathy measures, and studies of empathy or 
other social cognitive constructs should consider the role of cognitive symptoms in their 
results. 
 Some other intriguing associations emerged, as well. For cognitive empathy 
performance, age and negative symptoms were both associated at the bivariate level, but 
age remained highly significant across analyses (while negative symptoms were not 
significant at any level other than bivariate). Of interest, results suggested that those who 
were older performed more poorly on the cognitive empathy task, but this did not hold 
true for the affective empathy task. As both tasks pulled for some cognitive skills and 
were performed on a computer, it is unlikely that either of these factors can explain the 
age finding. While this could not be systematically investigated in this analysis, it is 
possible that the age finding actually reflects worsening social cognitive abilities over 
time, or over the course of the illness. Some literature suggests that duration of illness is 
negatively associated with empathic abilities (Bonfils et al., 2017), so it is a plausible 
explanation that age might reflect a manifestation of that association in this data. Thus, 
this finding could potentially contribute to the evidence base supporting duration of 
illness as a variable of importance in social cognition in schizophrenia. 
  Affective empathy performance was affected by different demographic and 
symptom variables, including race, marital status, and hostility (as measured by the 
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PANSS). For race, white participants scored significantly higher on the affective empathy 
task than black participants – on average scoring more than 10 points higher! The impact 
of one’s own race on empathic performance has not been investigated very deeply, but 
one study in the social psychology literature found there are no differences between white 
and black children on emotion recognition (Hindt, Davis, Schubert, Poehlmann-Tynan, & 
Shlafer, 2016). The literature in adults is also quite sparse, though one study indicates 
white and Asian-American medical students rate themselves as equally empathic (Berg, 
Majdan, Berg, Veloski, & Hojat, 2011). It is quite possible that the effect found in this 
study is a result of the prompts used in the task, which uses pictures of exclusively white 
actors. The Derntl paradigm was originally developed in Germany, where there is 
considerably less racial diversity than in the United States. It was also developed using a 
standardized set of facial stimuli. Standardization has its benefits, and development of the 
task would have been considerably more difficult if the authors had to create their own 
pictorial stimuli. However, the racial differences found and the fact that all stimuli are 
from a single race call into question the cultural generalizability of the task. This idea is 
supported by a body of literature indicating that people are generally better able to 
recognize the emotions of those in the same cultural group or race/ethnicity (for a meta-
analysis of these findings, see Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002). In a similar vein, research 
suggests that people are more likely to feel empathy toward members of their in-group 
(Eisenberg, Eggum, & Di Giunta, 2010), a finding that has been supported by both lab-
based experimental paradigms (Stürmer, Snyder, Kropp, & Siem, 2006; Stürmer, Snyder, 
& Omoto, 2005) and neuropsychological tasks (Chiao & Mathur, 2010). Taken together, 
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these findings suggest black participants may start with a disadvantage in the Derntl 
paradigm tasks, based on the all-white prompts. 
The relationship between race and empathic performance in schizophrenia is 
further complicated by the fact that the majority of studies investigating empathy have 
not reported race as a demographic characteristic; indeed, two recent meta-analyses 
examining empathy and related constructs in schizophrenia reported that fewer than 20% 
of included studies reported the racial distribution of their sample (Bonfils et al., 2016; 
Bonfils et al., 2017). It is logical to assume, then, that most researchers are not 
investigating the impact of race on their results in empathy studies in schizophrenia. 
Considering that more people diagnosed with schizophrenia in the United States are black 
than are white (Corrigan, Mueser, Bond, Drake, & Solomon, 2009), it is of the utmost 
importance that future measure development take cultural generalizability into account, 
and that researchers using existing tasks examine race as a potential control variable.  
 Marital status and hostility were both also associated with performance on the 
affective empathy task. Analyses for marital status indicated that those who were 
divorced or separated (35% of this sample) performed significantly better on the affective 
empathy task than those who were single (59% of this sample). They did not differ from 
those who were currently partnered, though this group was very small (5%). Thus, it is 
likely that this difference is reflecting lifetime interpersonal functioning – those with a 
history of significant, intimate relationships likely have greater empathic skills than those 
without such a history. For hostility, it may be that increased presence of negative 
emotions made it more difficult to correctly identify emotions throughout the affective 
empathy task. Alternatively, people with increased hostility may genuinely not endorse 
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the normative emotional response to the prompts in the task – meaning they may have 
answered accurately for their own emotional experience, but that experience does not 
align with that of the normative sample. Lastly, if a participant approached the interview 
with increased hostility, they may have been reluctant to put forth their best effort on the 
task. In light of these results and those for cognitive empathy, all studies of empathy 
should carefully examine demographic and symptom variables for potential covariates, 
especially considering that results for this study differed significantly upon inclusion of 
control variables in each model. 
Limitations 
 While this study had several strengths, including the use of a clinical sample, 
performance-based empathy measurement, and robust mediation and moderation 
analytical techniques, there were also some limitations. In addition to the measurement 
issues discussed above regarding the Derntl paradigm, there were some problems with 
the personal distress scale. While this is the traditional measure in the field used for this 
construct, and, in fact, the only available measure to my knowledge, it has some 
considerable weaknesses. First, the internal consistency was low in this sample (.56), 
suggesting not all items are measuring the same construct. Removal of any of the seven 
items on the scale did not result in an appreciably improved alpha, so all items were 
retained, but low internal consistency can result in needlessly conservative statistical 
analyses and increased risk of type II error (Warner, 2008). Of note, though this measure 
has been used extensively in schizophrenia research, internal consistency estimates are 
rarely reported. Future work is needed to either improve this scale or develop a new one. 
However, it may also be that personal distress is not measured well through self-report. 
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As mentioned above, some sort of mood induction or an observer-rated task may be more 
appropriate for this construct. 
 A self-report measure was also used to assess emotion regulation. For this study, 
that choice was made out of fiscal necessity and to keep interviews to a reasonable 
length. However, there are a number of available ways to measure emotion regulation, 
including performance-based and neuroimaging techniques (e.g., see Horan, Hajcak, 
Wynn, & Green, 2013; Strauss et al., 2013; Strauss et al., 2015; van der Meer, van't 
Wout, & Aleman, 2009). Further, emotion regulation as a construct has been variably 
defined. While Thompson's (1994) definition is widely used, it is not the only definition, 
and some researchers prefer to assess use of particular adaptive emotion regulation 
strategies, such as emotional management or attentional deployment (O'Driscoll et al., 
2014). Use of a different measure in this study, either different in methodology or 
construct definition, may have changed results. Future work should investigate how 
emotion regulation measures correlate with one another, and how various emotion 
regulation measurement strategies impact empathy and other social cognitive constructs. 
 Some limitations common to many schizophrenia studies apply here, as well. This 
data is cross-sectional and cannot test potential longitudinal relationships. For example, 
this data cannot tell us if low metacognition predicts later deficits in empathy, or if the 
experience of personal distress might reduce over time. The sample is also somewhat 
small. This can limit statistical power; indeed, a sample of 84 participants would have 
been required for .8 power to detect medium effects in correlation analyses, and some 
demographic analyses were underpowered. However, the sample size here was adequate 
for analyses to answer main hypotheses using regression, mediation, and moderation. The 
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sample may also not be representative of all with schizophrenia-spectrum disorders. One 
notable example of this is that the sample was majority female, an unusual distribution in 
schizophrenia studies. Further, nearly all participants came from the same urban 
community mental health center. Results may differ for those in other service settings. 
Lastly, a fairly large number of analyses were run here, resulting in some level of alpha 
inflation. Alpha correction was not employed because of the relatively small sample and 
the early nature of this research. All results should be replicated in larger, more 
representative samples.  
Conclusion 
 This study is the first of its kind to examine performance-based empathy with 
personal distress, emotion regulation, and metacognition. Taken together, results begin to 
answer some questions about the relationships amongst these variables, indicating that 
metacognition may be the most robust predictor of empathic performance. Further, 
results indicate that increased personal distress and reduced emotion regulation may 
actually convey some benefit in terms of affective empathy performance, while 
highlighting the need for additional work developing strong affective empathy measures. 
Clinically, results suggest interventions targeted to improve metacognition may be useful 
in enhancing empathic skills. Results point to the need for future research in a number of 
areas, including an examination of the cultural appropriateness of our measures for 
various demographic groups, development of a robust, performance-based or observer-
rated measure of personal distress, and ongoing investigation of the relationship between 
emotion regulation and empathic interaction. 
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TABLES 
Table 1 – Descriptive statistics and scale reliabilities 
Variable N Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Alpha 
Cognitive Empathy 
Performance 
(Derntl-EPT) 
57 40.6 7.3 n/a 
Affective Empathy 
Performance 
(Derntl-AR) 
57 111.1 14.6 n/a 
Personal Distress 
(IRI) 
57 2.1 0.7 .56  
Metacognition 
(MAS-A) 
58 12.5 3.4 .70 
Emotion Regulation 
(DERS) 
57 2.8 0.8 .93 
PANSS-Total 58 67.1 14.9 .85 
PANSS-Positive 58 15.5 4.8 .70 
PANSS-Negative 58 16.9 5.2 .75 
PANSS-Cognitive 58 14.2 4.3 .68 
PANSS-Emotional 
discomfort 
58 11.6 4.5 .76 
PANSS-Hostility 58 7.1 2.7 .76 
Note. Derntl-EPT = Emotional Perspective-Taking, range of 0-57; Derntl-AR = Affective 
Responsiveness, range of 0-150; IRI = Interpersonal Reactivity Index; scale of 0-4. MAS-
A = Metacognitive Assessment Scale, Abbreviated, range of 0-28; DERS = Difficulties 
in Emotion Regulation Scale, scale of 1-5. PANSS = Positive and Negative Syndrome 
Scale; total score has a range of 30-210. PANSS-Positive has a range of 6-42. PANSS-
Negative has a range of 8-56. PANSS-Cognitive has a range of 7-49. PANSS-Emotional 
discomfort has a range of 4-28. PANSS-Hostility has a range of 4-28. 
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Table 2 – Demographic characteristics (N=58) 
Variable n  Percentage 
Diagnosis   
Schizophrenia 36 62.1% 
Schizoaffective disorder 22 37.9% 
Gender   
Male 23 39.7% 
Female 35 60.3% 
Race   
Black 40 69.0% 
White 16 27.6% 
Mixed Race 1 1.7% 
Not reported 1 1.7% 
Hispanic 2 3.4% 
Marital Status   
Single, never married 34 58.6% 
Married or living with partner 3 5.2% 
Separated or divorced 20 34.5% 
Widowed 1 1.7% 
Education   
Less than HS 20 34.5% 
HS diploma or GED 13 22.4% 
Some college 22 37.9% 
Bachelor’s level degree 3 5.2% 
Employment   
Paid employment 14 24.1% 
Casual work 1 1.7% 
Unemployed, but wants to work 11 19.0% 
Other (SSI/SSDI) 32 55.2% 
Housing   
Homeless 2 3.4% 
Staying with friends/family temporarily 2 3.4% 
Congregate living 8 13.8% 
Semi-independent living 3 5.2% 
Living with family 4 6.9% 
Own apartment or house with 
spouse/partner/friends 
17 29.3% 
Own apartment or house, alone 22 37.9% 
 M SD 
Months in current residence 36.89 51.70 
Number of places lived in the past year 1.84 1.15 
Age 46.60 9.75 
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Table 3 - Correlations 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Cognitive 
Empathy 
Performance 
(Derntl-EPT) 
1 
          
2. Affective 
Empathy 
Performance 
(Derntl-AR) 
.60** 1 
         
3. Metacognition 
(MAS-A) 
.46** .41** 1 
        
4. Personal 
Distress (IRI) 
-.07 .09 -.13 1 
       
5. Emotion 
Regulation 
(DERS) 
-.17 -.07 -.06 .54** 1 
      
6. PANSS-Total -.17 -.22 -.14 .26 .58** 1 
     
7. PANSS-
Positive 
.11 -.05 .09 .21 .48** .76** 1 
    
8. PANSS-
Negative 
-.26* -.18 -.23 .15 .27* .68** .20 1 
   
9. PANSS-
Cognitive 
-.40** -.45** -.19 .03 .14 .57** .21 .41** 1 
  
10. PANSS-
Emotional 
Discomfort 
.11 .16 .00 .32* .58** .74** .65** .35** .04 1 
 
11. PANSS-
Hostility 
-.11 -.30* -.09 .20 .59** .62** .59** .13 .18 .52** 1 
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed). * Correlation is significant at the 
.05 level (2-tailed). EPT = Emotional Perspective-Taking; AR = Affective 
Responsiveness; MAS-A = Metacognitive Assessment Scale, Abbreviated; IRI = 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index; DERS = Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale. Higher 
scores for the Derntl paradigm tasks and MAS-A total score indicate better performance 
or higher metacognitive capacity, respectively. Higher scores on the IRI Personal Distress 
scale and the DERS total score indicate greater experience of personal distress and 
reduced emotion regulation, respectively. Removing Pt. 152 (the outlier for PD) did not 
substantively change any of the correlation results. 
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Table 4 – Regression Results, Cognitive Empathy Performance 
 B SEB β t p R
2 
Adjusted 
R2 
Model 1 – Personal Distress        
Step 1 (F(1, 54) = 0.29, p = .594)      .01 -.01 
Constant 42.35 2.91  14.54 .000   
Personal Distress -0.71 1.32 -0.07 -0.54 .594   
Step 2 (F(5, 55) = 4.05, p = .004)      .29 .22 
Constant 61.53 5.93  10.38 .000   
Personal Distress -0.96 1.21 -0.10 -0.79 .431   
Age -0.24 0.09 -0.32 -2.67 .010   
Diagnosis (Schizoaffective) 2.94 1.83 0.20 1.61 .114   
Cognitive symptoms -0.50 0.25 -0.27 -2.03 .048   
Negative symptoms -0.11 0.18 -0.08 -0.61 .545   
Model 2 – Emotion Regulation        
Step 1 (F(1, 54) = 1.65, p = .204)      .03 .01 
Constant 45.55 3.76  12.13 .000   
Emotion Regulation -1.67 1.30 -0.17 -1.29 .204   
Step 2 (F(5, 50) = 4.26, p = .003)      .30 .23 
Constant 62.99 6.13  10.28 .000   
Emotion Regulation -1.46 1.25 -0.15 -1.17 .247   
Age -0.25 0.09 -0.34 -2.83 .007   
Diagnosis (Schizoaffective) 2.99 1.80 0.21 1.67 .102   
Cognitive symptoms -0.44 0.25 -0.24 -1.76 .084   
Negative symptoms -0.09 0.18 -0.07 -0.48 .631   
Model 3 – Metacognition        
Step 1 (F(1, 55) = 14.70, p <.001)      .21 .20 
Constant 28.25 3.34  8.45 .000   
Metacognition 0.99 0.26 0.46 3.83 .000   
Step 2 (F(5, 51) = 7.74, p < .001)      .43 .38 
Constant 48.95 6.30  7.77 .000   
Metacognition 0.78 0.24 0.36 3.29 .002   
Age -0.22 0.08 -0.29 -2.74 .008   
Diagnosis (Schizoaffective) 1.80 1.64 0.12 1.09 .279   
Cognitive symptoms -0.57 0.22 -0.31 -2.62 .011   
Negative symptoms -0.03 0.17 -0.02 -0.17 .866   
Note. Higher scores for the cognitive empathy tasks and metacognition indicate better 
performance or higher metacognitive capacity, respectively. Higher scores on personal 
distress and emotion regulation indicate greater experience of personal distress and 
reduced emotion regulation, respectively. Removing Pt. 152 (the outlier for personal 
distress) did not substantively change any of the regression results. 
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Table 5 – Regression Results, Affective Empathy Performance 
 B SEB β t p R
2 
Adjusted 
R2 
Model 1 – Personal Distress        
Step 1 (F(1, 52) = 0.26, p = .615)      .01 -.01 
Constant 108.32 5.92  18.29 .000   
Personal Distress 1.36 2.69 0.07 0.51 .615   
Step 2 (F(7, 46) = 6.76, p < .001)      .51 .43 
Constant 129.09 7.17  18.00 .000   
Personal Distress 0.80 2.19 0.04 0.37 .716   
Diagnosis (Schizoaffective) 5.88 3.27 0.20 1.80 .079   
Race (White) 8.52 3.53 0.27 2.42 .020   
Marital (currently partnered) 13.48 6.98 0.22 1.93 .060   
Marital (separated/divorced) 9.16 3.24 0.31 2.83 .007   
Cognitive symptoms -0.89 0.42 -0.24 -2.11 .040   
Hostility -2.21 0.62 -.041 -3.54 .001   
Model 2 – Emotion Regulation        
Step 1 (F(1, 52) = 0.22, p = .642)      .00 -.02 
Constant 114.64 7.73  14.83 .000   
Emotion Regulation -1.25 2.67 -0.07 -0.47 .642   
Step 2 (F(7, 46) = 4.56, p < .001)      .54 .46 
Constant 124.78 7.04  17.72 .000   
Emotion Regulation 4.12 2.43 0.21 1.70 .096   
Diagnosis (Schizoaffective) 5.29 3.19 0.18 1.66 .104   
Race (White) 8.58 3.38 0.27 2.54 .015   
Marital (currently partnered) 13.66 6.68 0.22 2.05 .047   
Marital (separated/divorced) 9.19 3.14 0.31 2.93 .005   
Cognitive symptoms -0.98 0.41 -0.26 -2.37 .022   
Hostility -2.78 -0.70 -0.52 -3.99 .000   
Model 3 – Metacognition        
Step 1 (F(1, 53) = 9.33, p = .004)      .15 .13 
Constant 90.24 6.97  12.94 .000   
Metacognition 1.65 0.54 0.39 3.05 .004   
Step 2 (F(7, 47) = 8.00, p < .001)      .54 .48 
Constant 120.19 8.76  13.72 .000   
Metacognition 0.79 0.46 0.18 1.72 .093   
Diagnosis (Schizoaffective) 5.16 3.18 0.17 1.62 .112   
Race (White) 8.47 3.37 0.26 2.51 .015   
Marital (currently partnered) 10.21 6.87 0.16 1.49 .144   
Marital (separated/divorced) 8.05 3.21 0.27 2.51 .016   
Cognitive symptoms -0.98 0.38 -0.27 -2.57 .013   
Hostility -1.82 0.59 -0.34 -3.07 .004   
Note. Higher scores for the cognitive empathy tasks and metacognition indicate better 
performance or higher metacognitive capacity, respectively. Higher scores on personal 
distress and emotion regulation indicate greater experience of personal distress and 
reduced emotion regulation, respectively. Removing Pt. 152 (the outlier for personal 
distress) did not substantively change any of the regression results. 
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Table 6 - Mediation Results, Cognitive Empathy Performance  
Basic Mediation Model 
 Coefficient SE t p 
Outcome: Emotion Regulation (a path) 
Constant 1.59 0.25 6.47 <.001 
Personal Distress 0.58 0.11 5.17 <.001 
Outcome: Cognitive Empathy (b and c’ paths) 
Constant 45.36 3.87 11.73 <.001 
Emotion Regulation -1.89 1.60 -1.18 .243 
Personal Distress 0.38 1.60 0.24 .812 
Indirect Effect Bootstrap Estimates 
95% Confidence 
interval 
 Effect SE Lower Upper 
Effect of Personal Distress on Cognitive 
Empathy through Emotion Regulation -1.09 1.02 -3.31 0.81 
 
Mediation Model with Control Variables 
 Coefficient SE t p 
Outcome: Emotion Regulation (a path) 
Constant 1.16 0.55 2.12 .039 
Personal Distress 0.55 0.11 4.89 <.001 
Diagnosis (Schizoaffective) 0.08 0.17 0.46 .644 
Age -0.01 0.01 -1.09 .281 
Cognitive Symptoms 0.04 0.02 1.80 .078 
Negative Symptoms 0.02 0.02 1.08 .284 
Outcome: Cognitive Empathy (b and c’ paths) 
Constant 63.07 6.21 10.16 <.001 
Emotion Regulation -1.32 1.53 -0.86 .392 
Personal Distress -0.24 1.47 -0.16 .873 
Diagnosis (Schizoaffective) 3.04 1.84 1.66 .104 
Age -0.25 0.09 -2.77 .008 
Cognitive Symptoms -0.45 0.26 -1.75 .087 
Negative Symptoms -0.09 0.18 -0.47 .640 
Indirect Effect Bootstrap Estimates 
95% Confidence 
interval 
 Effect SE Lower Upper 
Effect of Personal Distress on Cognitive 
Empathy through Emotion Regulation -0.72 0.95 -2.72 1.12 
Note. Higher scores for the cognitive empathy tasks and metacognition indicate better 
performance or higher metacognitive capacity, respectively. Higher scores on personal distress 
and emotion regulation indicate greater experience of personal distress and reduced emotion 
regulation, respectively. Removing Pt. 152 (the outlier for personal distress) did not substantively 
change any of the mediation results.  
72 
 
Table 7 - Mediation Results, Affective Empathy Performance 
Basic Mediation Model 
 Coefficient SE t p 
Outcome: Emotion Regulation (a path) 
Constant 1.59 0.25 6.47 <.001 
Personal Distress 0.58 0.11 5.17 <.001 
Outcome: Affective Empathy (b and c’ paths) 
Constant 113.54 7.88 14.41 <.001 
Emotion Regulation -3.80 3.27 -1.16 .250 
Personal Distress 4.05 3.27 1.24 .221 
Indirect Effect Bootstrap Estimates 
95% Confidence 
interval 
 Effect SE Lower Upper 
Effect of Personal Distress on Affective 
Empathy through Emotion Regulation -2.19 2.11 -7.05 1.55 
 
Mediation Model with Control Variables 
 Coefficient SE t p 
Outcome: Emotion Regulation (a path) 
Constant 0.58 0.34 1.71 .094 
Personal Distress 0.52 0.10 4.98 <.001 
Diagnosis (Schizoaffective) 0.08 0.16 0.54 .592 
Race (White) -0.10 0.17 -0.58 .563 
Marital (Currently partnered) 0.15 0.33 0.44 .661 
Marital (Divorced/separated) -0.42 0.15 -0.27 .787 
Cognitive Symptoms 0.02 0.02 0.96 .342 
Hostility 0.12 0.03 4.11 <.001 
Outcome: Affective Empathy (b and c’ paths) 
Constant 125.88 7.21 17.45 <.001 
Emotion Regulation 5.51 3.02 1.82 .075 
Personal Distress -2.05 2.65 -0.77 .443 
Diagnosis (Schizoaffective) 5.41 3.20 1.69 .100 
Race (White) 9.06 3.45 2.62 .012 
Marital (Currently partnered) 12.67 6.83 1.86 .070 
Marital (Divorced/separated) 9.39 3.16 2.97 .005 
Cognitive Symptoms -1.00 0.42 -2.40 .021 
Hostility -2.88 0.71 -4.05 <.001 
Indirect Effect Bootstrap Estimates 
95% Confidence 
interval 
 Effect SE Lower Upper 
Effect of Personal Distress on Affective 
Empathy through Emotion Regulation 2.86 1.61 0.31 6.95 
Note. Higher scores for the cognitive empathy tasks and metacognition indicate better 
performance or higher metacognitive capacity, respectively. Higher scores on personal distress 
and emotion regulation indicate greater experience of personal distress and reduced emotion 
regulation, respectively. Removing Pt. 152 (the outlier for personal distress) did not substantively 
change any of the mediation results. 
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Table 8 - Moderation Results, Cognitive Empathy Performance 
Variable Coefficient SE t p 
Cognitive Empathy, no control variables: R2 = .17, F = 3.67, p = .018 
Constant 24.74 11.78 2.10 .041 
Metacognition 1.30 0.88 1.48 .146 
Personal Distress 2.15 5.10 0.42 .675 
Interaction Term -0.19 0.39 -0.48 .633 
Cognitive Empathy, control variables added: R2 = .42, F = 4.94, p < .001 
Constant 37.20 11.34 3.28 .002 
Metacognition 1.85 0.83 2.24 .030 
Personal Distress 5.98 4.78 1.25 .217 
Interaction Term -0.50 0.36 -1.40 .169 
Diagnosis (Schizoaffective) 1.61 1.74 0.93 .359 
Age -0.23 0.08 -2.74 .009 
Cognitive Symptoms -0.67 0.24 -2.78 .008 
Negative Symptoms 0.00 0.17 -0.01 .996 
Note. Higher scores for the cognitive empathy tasks and metacognition indicate better 
performance or higher metacognitive capacity, respectively. Higher scores on personal 
distress and emotion regulation indicate greater experience of personal distress and 
reduced emotion regulation, respectively. Removing Pt. 152 (the outlier for personal 
distress) did not substantively change any of the moderation results. 
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Table 9 - Moderation Results, Affective Empathy Performance 
Variable Coefficient SE t p 
Affective Empathy, no control variables: R2 = .17, F = 3.59, p = .020 
Constant 65.18 24.07 2.71 .009 
Metacognition 3.16 1.80 1.75 .086 
Personal Distress 11.07 10.42 1.06 .293 
Interaction Term -0.65 0.79 -0.82 .417 
Affective Empathy, control variables added: R2 = .58, F = 6.82, p < .001 
Constant 81.12 18.74 4.33 <.001 
Metacognition 3.99 1.48 2.70 .010 
Personal Distress 20.27 8.55 2.37 .022 
Interaction Term -1.48 0.65 -2.29 .027 
Diagnosis (Schizoaffective) 3.62 3.18 1.14 .262 
Race (White) 7.87 3.33 2.36 .023 
Marital (Currently partnered) 10.12 6.76 1.50 .142 
Marital (Divorced/separated) 7.68 3.15 2.44 .019 
Cognitive Symptoms -1.26 0.42 -3.00 .005 
Hostility -1.89 0.61 -3.08 .004 
Note. Higher scores for the cognitive empathy tasks and metacognition indicate better 
performance or higher metacognitive capacity, respectively. Higher scores on personal 
distress and emotion regulation indicate greater experience of personal distress and 
reduced emotion regulation, respectively. Removing Pt. 152 (the outlier for personal 
distress) did not substantively change any of the moderation results. 
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FIGURES 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Conceptual model of hypothesized mediation of the relationship between 
personal distress and empathy by emotion regulation. 
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Figure 2. Conceptual model of hypothesized moderation of the relationship between 
personal distress and empathy by metacognition. 
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Figure 3. Visualization of relationship between personal distress and affective empathy, 
moderated by metacognition total scores. M=Metacognitive Assessment Scale-
Abbreviated (MAS-A) total score. Visualization created using the pick-a-point approach, 
with lines plotted at the mean of personal distress as well as +/- one standard deviation. 
For plotting, all control variables are held at their mean from this data. 
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